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'Utility' has been the central concept in economics for a long time.  See, for 
example, Stigler (1950) for an excellent review of the history of the concept of 
utility  in  economics.  There  have  been various  attempts  to  undermine  the 
position  of the  utility  concept.  The  most famous is probably Samuelson's 
theory of revealed preference, which was an attempt to get rid of 'utility' for 
good. ~ Due to Houthakker  (1950),  we know now that  revealed preference 
theory is basically equivalent to neoclassical choice theory. Thus, at present 
the utility concept is more important than ever in economic theory. 
Still,  economists  have  a  somewhat  ambiguotls  attitude  towards  utility, 
which is exemplified most clearly by the way in which they try to enhance their 
empirical knowledge of utility. As a rule, measurement takes place indirectly; 
asking people questions about their utility is considered to be fruitless. The 
only way in which economists allow themselves to learn about utility functions 
of economic agents is by observing their behaviour.  This self-restraint with 
respect to the measurement of the central concept of their discipline t~as far- 
reaching consequences for the nature of economic theorizing. In this paper, I 
will discuss some of these consequences. 
2 WHAT IS UTILITY? 
'Utility'  is  roughly  synonymous with  'satisfaction,'  'well-being,'  'welfare,' 
'happiness,' 'pleasure,' etc.  Generally, we can increase our utility by undertak- 
ing  enjoyable  activities  or  purchasing  things  we  desire.  In  the  words  of 
Bentham (1823, p. 3): 'By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby 
it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness  ...'  Of 
course, this description is rather too loose to serve as a definition. To Bentharn 
and his contemporaries 'utility' was aprimitive term. That is, they appeared to 
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agree on the meaning of 'utility,' without an exact definition being necessary. 
In modern economic theory, this is not the common way the utility concept 
is introduced. Nowadays the preference ordering is taken as a primitive term. 
An individual's preference ordering ranks alternatives in order of preference. 
If two individuals express the same preference in each conceivable decision 
situation, their preference orderings are identical. If, however, given a choice 
between going to a soccer game and attending a concert of classical music, one 
individual chooses the soccer game and the other one prefers the concert, then 
their preference orderings are different. 
One  would  expect  that,  in  making  decisions,  an  individual will  try  to 
enhance his utility. If I express a preference for a soccer game over a classical 
concert, then it seems reasonable to infer that my utility will be higher when I 
visit the game than when I  attend the concert. If not, we would have some 
doubt about the utility concept used, or the concept of preference would be 
used in a  somewhat p~rverse manner. In economic theory, such a perverse 
relationship between utility and preference cannot occur, because 'utility' is 
defined such that a preferred alternative always represents a higher utility level 
(or at least not a lower one) than the rejected alternative. 'Utility' is no longer 
a primitive term, but it is defined in terms of preferences. 
An example may clarify this: microeconomic models of consumer behaviour 
describe how people choose from different consumption bundles. It is com- 
monly assumed that consumers are able to rank all relevant alternatives in 
order of preference. A  utility function, i.e. a relationship that tells us for any 
consumption bundle how much pleasure the consumer derives from it, has to 
satisfy the requirement that it agrees with the consumer's preference ordering, 
in the sense that each time the consumer prefers bundle A  to bundle B, the 
utility function tells us that A gives more utility than B. Under rather plausible 
assumptions concerning the structure of a consumer's preference ordering, it 
can be shown that such a utility function exists (see, e.g., Debreu, 1959).  It is 
then said that the utility function represents the preference ordering. 
For the simplest case, where only quantities of one good have to be com- 
pared, the utility function can be drawn in a simple diagram, as in Fig. 1, which 
depicts utility functions of income of three different individuals.  2 
3 ON ORDINAL AND CARDINAL MEASURABILITY 
Looking at Fig. 1, we notice that each of the individuals prefer more income to 
less. In other words, each time they have a choice between two income levels, 
each individual chooses the higher income level. So, with respect to income 
the three individuals have identical preference orderings. 'More is better than 
less.' As a representation of a preference ordering the three utility functions 
are hence equivalent. In standard economic parlance, we say that 'utility' is an 
2  In this paper, 'income' is defined throughout as annual after tax disposable income. UTILITY AND ECONOMICS  3 
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Figure 1 -  Utility functions of income of three individuals 
ordinal  concept:  The  numbers on the vertical axis are  arbitrary.  The  only 
requirement is that a higher utility level is associated with a higher number. 
Only the ordering of the numbers on the vertical axis counts, not their value. 
Although Fig. 1 refers to the simplest possible case where only quantities of 
one good (income) are compared, the same conclusion holds for situations in 
which one has to choose between bundles of goods. Consider, for example, the 
case of a man whose lunch consists of only two ingredients, water and bread. 
He  is  able  to  rank  all  water/bread  combinations  in  order  of preference. 
Assume  that  we  are  able  to  find  a  utility  function  which  represents  this 
preference ordering, i.e., in each pair-wise comparison of water/bread bundles 
the  preferred  bundle  has the  highest  utility.  It is then very simple  to find 
another utility function representing the same preference ordering, for exam- 
ple by multiplying all utility levels higher than 10 by 100 and by dividing all 
utility levels below 10 by 100. This transformation does not affect the ordering 
of utility levels. 
Clearly, the preference ordering  contains  all the information we need to 
explain (or predict) consumer choice. This is because the preference ordering 
tells us, for each situation, which consumption bundle is preferred. Hence we 
can predict the consumer's choice in each situation. Since, in turn, an ordinal 
utility function provides us with complete information about the correspond- 
ing preference ordering,  it also provides all information that is necessary to 
explain behaviour. 
The conclusion that an ordinal utility function suffices to explain behaviour 
was first drawn by Fisher and Pareto at the turn of the century. Since then, 
ordinal utility has dominated economic theory (cf.  Stigler, 1950). 
Ordinal measurability is a rather weak property. Although someone's utility 
function can tell us that this individual prefers one liter of water and 5 slices of 
bread to half a liter of water and 6 slices of bread, it cannot tell us anything 
about  utility  differences.  We  do  not  know  whether  the  utility  difference 4  A. KAPTEYN 
between 1 liter of water and 5 slices of bread and half a liter of water and 6 slices 
of bread exceeds the utility difference between half a liter of water and 6 slices 
of bread and half a liter of water and 5 slices of bread. It that were possible, 
utility would be said to be measurable on a cardinal scale. 
Of course, the fact that an ordinally measurable utility concept suffices to 
describe  economic  choices  3 does  not  imply  that  cardinal  measurement  is 
impossible. Still, this appears to be the conclusion which most economists have 
drawn from Fisher's and Pareto's analyses. 
The supposition that utility can only be measured on an ordinal scale has 
direct  consequences  for our capacity to  learn  something  about  utility.  To 
illustrate this, let us reconsider Fig. 1. Apparently, it does not make sense to 
ask someone what utility level he attaches, for example, on a [0,1] scale, to an 
income of say,  75,000  guilders.  The  three graphs  are equivalent represen- 
tations of the  same  preference ordering.  Yet they generate quite  different 
answers  to  the  above  question.  Also  the  reverse  question,  which  income 
corresponds to a certain point on the utility scale, does not make sense. So, the 
measurement of utility functions by means of direct questioning (I will call this 
'direct  measurement')  is  impossible  if utility can  only be  measured  on  an 
ordinal scale. 
Indeed, the prevailing opinion among economists appears to be that direct 
measurement  of utility is  impossible.  This  is  nicely illustrated  by referee 
reports Bernard van Praag  and I  have received with respect to one of our 
papers. 4 One referee states:  'Unlike the authors,  I  am very dubious of the 
extent to which we can learn anything useful by asking people how happy they 
are, or what level of income will make them happy to a certain degree.' And 
the second referee adds:  '...  the authors -  like everyone else -  do not and 
cannot measure utility directly. ,5 
Now assume for a moment that indeed utility can only be measured on an 
ordinal scale. Still, out of mere stubbornness, we ask a respondent in a survey 
which income he associates with a utility level of, say, 0.5 on a [0,1] scale. What 
happens then? According to our assumptions, the respondent faces an impos- 
sible task.  Psychologists may be able to predict what the respondent will do 
next; maybe he flatly refuses to answer the question, or he may express a low 
opinion about the interviewer's intelligence,  or he may become aggressive 
towards the interviewer or simply throw him out. 
I do not know whether Bernard van Praag was aware of these and other risks 
when he started asking people which income levels they associate with verbally 
3  I  ignore choices in uncertain or dynamic settings. In these cases a  cardinal utility concept 
appears to be necessary. See, for instance, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),  and Koop- 
mans (1972). 
4  'A New Approach to the Construction of Family Equivalence Scales.' 
5  The paper was eventually accepted for publication, but not by the journal for which these 
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labelled  utility levels  like  'excellent,'  'good,'  'sufficient,' etc.  (Van  Praag, 
1971).  Since he started, these kind of questions have been posed to  about 
50,000 respondents in different countries and it appears that attempts at direct 
measurement of utility functions of income do not lead to strong emotions on 
the part of the interviewee nor to physical harm to the interviewer. 
Although the happy ending of this adventure may give us some confidence 
in the possibility of direct utility measurement, it is not the only piece of 
evidence.  For  example,  it  appears  to  be  possible to  discriminate between 
possible  forms of utility functions. In other words,  for the respondents in 
surveys in which direct utility measurement was undertaken, the three exam- 
ples drawn in Fig. 1 are definitely not equivalent (see Van Herwaarden and 
Kapteyn, 1981). 
4 INDIRECT MEASUREMENT OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
In the remainder of the paper, I will consider the question of to what extent 
direct measurement of utility functions can help to solve some theoretical and 
practical  problems  in  economics.  To  this  end  we  first have  to  give  some 
thought to the role of utility functions in empirical economic models. 
In economic models of behaviour, it is invariably assumed that an individual 
behaves in such a way that his utility is maximized. In his attempts to maximize 
utility, he is hampered by one or more constraints. The standard example of 
this kind of modelling iS the neoclassical model of consumption behaviour 
where the consumer faces the task of spending his income on consumption 
goods  so  as  to  maximize his  utility. Under  rather  weak assumptions,  the 
consumer's purchases are uniquely determined by his income and the prices he 
has to pay (together constituting the budget constraints) and the form of his 
utility function (representing his preferences). As said earlier, it suffices that 
the utility function is measurable on an ordinal scale. 
Thus, in economic models an individual's behaviour is completely deter- 
mined  by  two  things:  his  preferences -  represented  by  an  ordinal  utility 
function -  and the constraints that limit his behaviour. If a researcher knows 
these constraints, he can employ observations on the individual's behaviour to 
draw conclusions about the individual's preferences. 
This is the so-called revealed preference approach but I will usually denote it 
as indirect utility measurement,  in contrast with direct utility measurement, as 
introduced above. The advantage of indirect utility measurement is that, in 
general, one can do without the assumption of cardinal measurability. Invok- 
ing Ockham's razor  6 this assumption has therefore been removed from eco- 
nomic theory. 
The removal of the cardinality assumptions is not without cost, however. 
6  "What  can be done with  fewer  (assumptions)  is done  in vain  with  more.' Ascribed  to William  of 
Ockham (ca. 1285-1349). See Edwards (1967, p. 307). 6  A. KAPTEYN 
The price that has to be paid consists of a sizeable number of other assump- 
tions. To make that clear, let us once again consider the economic theory of 
consumer  behaviour.  To obtain  reasonably accurate  knowledge  about  the 
utility function of a consumer, we need a rather large number of observations 
on his behaviour in different situations.  Specifically, we have to observe the 
consumption bundle he chooses at different combinations of prices and in- 
Come. However, we cannot vary prices and income at will. 7 Hence a different 
approach is adopted. The utility function is assumed to have some, a priori 
specified, plausible  functional form with some unknown parameters whose 
values have to be determined. 
By and large, different families, or groups of families, are assumed to have 
identical utility functions.  By observing families, or groups of them, for an 
extended period of time, sufficient variation in prices and income will occur so 
that one is able to estimate the unknown parameters. Once the demand system 
and hence the utility function has been estimated,  future behaviour can be 
predicted. 
What are,  in view of this procedure, the additional assumptions  that are 
required to measure utility functions indirectly? They include the following: 
-  The a priori specified functional form is correct. 
-  The utility functions of different families are indeed identical and they do 
not shift over time. 
-  Observed behaviour of families does indeed stem from the maximization of 
a utility function subject to constraints. 
-  The utility of families is not dependent upon the behaviour of other fam- 
ilies. 
-  Families  have  at  their disposal  all  relevant information  required  for an 
optimal decision. The information is certain. 
This list of assumptions is easily extended. For example, in many empirical 
studies aggregation requires additional assumptions. On the other hand, some 
of these assumptions have been relaxed in certain studies. 8 However this may 
be, it is a fairly long list and each of the assumptions is questionable. 
The most problematic aspect of this list of assumptions is not its length, but 
the virtual impossibility to test assumptions separately. By way of example, 
imagine  that  in  the  way  described  above  we  have  estimated  'the'  utility 
function of 'the' (representative) household in the Netherlands and the corre- 
sponding  demand  functions for consumption goods.  Furthermore,  imagine 
that we use the results to predict aggregate private consumption in the future. 
7  Exceptions  are to some extent prisons, psychiatric wards and animal laboratories where 
experiments are carried out occasionally.  See. for instance, Battalio  et al. (1973), Battalio, Kagel, 
Reynolds (1978), Lea (1982). 
8  See, for instance, Phlips (1972, 1974), Manser (1976) and Pollak (1978), and the references 
therein for models where changing preferences are allowed. In Muellbauer (1977, 1980) one finds 
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Finally, suppose the predictions are inferior2 What should we conclude then? 
Were  we  mistaken  in  assuming  that  families  try to  maximize  utility?  Do 
different families have different utility functions? Do utility functions shift 
over time? Did we specify an incorrect functional form? Did we make mistakes 
in the aggregation of family demand functions to aggregate demand functions? 
Are  there  informational  constraints  that  prevent  families  from  finding  a 
position with maximum  utility? Disentangling  these  and other possibilities 
presents an arduous task. 
Now  assume  that  we  are  able  to  measure  a  consumer's  utility function 
directly,  that  is,  without  resort to observations about his  behaviour.  Such 
measurement could be the result of extensive interviews, or the outcome of 
psychological experiments.i° In this case the assumptions can be tested separ- 
ately. We can first investigate what the form of the utility function is. Next, we 
investigate whether different consumers have identical utility functions. If not, 
we  can try to find out what causes the differences. In the  third place,  the 
measured utility functions can then be used to see if consumers do maximize 
utility or whether they follow different rules of behaviour. 
Thus we see that if it is possible to measure utility directly, independent of 
observations about behaviour, research into economic behaviour can be split 
up into a number of elements that can be investigated separately. This makes 
research into economic behaviour simpler, although not simple. 
The three elements distinguished here, measurement of utility functions, 
explanation of differences between individuals, tests of behavioural hypoth- 
eses, constitute a research program to which I have devoted a substantial part 
of my time, in collaboration with others. A  major part of this work has been 
done as part of the so-called Leyden Income Evaluation Project. 
It is worth noting that the research program outlined here fits in with the 
predominant paradigm in economics. But the direct measurement of utility 
functions  leads  to  a  research practice that  is  quite  different from existing 
practice. In the remainder of the paper, this will be illustrated by means of the 
second part of the research program: the explanation of differences in utility 
functions among consumers. 
5 PREFERENCE FORMATION 
I  will denote theories dealing with the explanation of differences in  utility 
functions  among  individuals,  or families,  as  theories of preference forma- 
9  A rather plausible assumption, considering experiences with the prediction of aggregate 
consumption in the Netherlands over the past twenty years. See Van der Leeuw (1984). 
10  As experiments  dealing  with decisions  under uncertainty. See Grether (1978) or Schoemaker 
(1982) for reviews. 8  A. KAPTEYN 
tion. n It is customary to distinguish two aspects to preference formation, viz. 
habit formation  and  preference  interdependence.  Habit  formation  is  the 
phenomenon by which my behaviour in the past (or results of that behaviour) 
influences my present preferences. Preference interdependence denotes the 
phenomenon by which behaviour of others influences my preferences. In the 
first instance, I like to have a house with a garden because I am used to having 
one. In the second instance, I like to have a house with a garden because most 
of my friends have one. 
To incorporate preference formation into demand systems creates a number 
of thorny problems. As observed by Duesenberry (1949, p. 17): 'Ordinarily we 
try  to  measure  preference  parameters  (or  functions  of them)  by  market 
behavior,  since  we  cannot  observe  the  preferences  directly.  With  shifting 
parameters we should be carrying indirect measurement a  step further. We 
would not only have to measure the preference parameters but the parameters 
of the relation governing shifts in the preference.' To find the correct specifica- 
tions to describe these shifts then becomes a risky enterprise, especially since 
we  do  not  know  the  correct  form  of the  utility function  nor  the  correct 
behavioural rule (utility maximization or something else), etc.  As a  result, 
most economists have abstained from incorporating preference formation into 
models of demand. Habit formation is encountered occasionally in empirical 
work. 12 Empirical studies of preference interdependence in demand systems 
are at present virtually nonexistent53 
Some economists simply deny that preferences may change, e.g. Stigler and 
Becker (1977, p. 76) who state that '... tastes (do) neither change capriciously 
nor differ importantly between people.., one does not argue over tastes for 
the same reason that one does not argue over the Rocky Mountains - both are 
there, will be there next year, too, and are the same to all men.' In their paper, 
they explain  a  number  of instances  of apparent  shifts in  preference,  e.g. 
addiction, advertising and fashion, by assuming that in all these cases it is an 
individual's efficiency as  a  producer of pleasure  that  changes,  but not his 
preferences. It is hard to imagine that their paper would have been written had 
the authors had available directly measured utility functions and had these 
utility functions been different for different individuals. 
In  sum,  indirect  (revealed  preference)  measurement  of utility functions 
makes it harder to model preference formation adequately. On the other hand 
this makes it easier to maintain that preferences are constant and the same for 
everyone, irrespective of empirical evidence. 
11  For, utility functions  represent preferences. So, if preferences differ, utility  functions  differ, 
and vice versa. 
12  E.g., Houthakker and Taylor (1970), Philips (1972, 1974), Manser (1976), Darrough, Pollak 
and Wales (1983). 
13  An exception  is Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt, Wansbeek (1984). UTILITY AND ECONOMICS  9 
6 ARE PREFERENCES CONSTANT AND THE SAME FOR EVERYONE? 
To answer this question, let us consider some examples. The first example is 
from Duncan (1975). In two surveys of housewives in the Greater Detroit area, 
held in 1955 and 1971, the respondents were asked to express their satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with their standard of living. Although real median income in 
the 1971 survey was 42%  higher than in the 1955 survey, the distribution of 
responses in both years was virtually the same. Within each survey, however, 
satisfaction  with  one's  standard  of living correlates significantly,  and posi- 
tively, with income. 
Can we reconcile these outcomes with constant and identical preferences? If 
preferences are constant and the same for everyone, one would expect that 
people with a higher income are more satisfied with it than people with a lower 
income.  This  expectation is  confirmed in  both years.  But one would  also 
expect the 1971 respondents to be more satisfied, on average, than the 1955 
respondents. This expectation is not confirmed at all. Duncan's findings can be 
explained better by the hypothesis that preferences are relative. That is, people 
evaluate their income or standard of living by comparing it to the income or 
standard of living of others. 
The idea that preferences are relative is also confirmed by a well-known 
study of Easterlin (1974), who uses self-ratings of happiness by individuals in 
various countries -  rich and poor, eastern and western.  Within each country, 
the happiness ratings correlated positively with income, but across countries 
there is no discernible relationship between national income per capita and the 
mean happiness rating of a country. 
As one might expect, the relativity of preferences, or evaluations, is not 
restricted to the income domain.  For instance, Davis (1966) finds that self- 
confidence of American students -  and especially their career plans -  depend 
heavily on their performance relative to their fellow students. This happens 
despite the fact that in the American system the best student at one university 
might very well have been the worst student at another university. ~4 
The number of these examples can be increased almost at will. In sociology, 
Relative Deprivation theory (RD theory, for short) explains phenomena like 
these. ~5 The extent to which an individual is relatively deprived with respect to 
a certain dimension depends on whom he compares himself with and whether 
these others are doing better or worse on this dimension than the individual 
himself.  Suppose, the relevant dimension for me at this moment is 'playing 
chess' and I compare my own abilities with those of the faculty members at the 
department of econometrics of Tilburg University. As far as chess ability is 
concerned, I will be rather deprived. If, instead of comparing myself with my 
14  See also Bassis (1971) for a related analysis and Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982) for an 
interpretation. 
15  See, for instance, Stouffer et al. (1949), Merton and Kitt (1950), Davis (1959), Runciman 
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colleagues in the department, I compare myself  with the other members of my 
family, my deprivation is really not so dramatic. However, this tends to take a 
turn for the worse, with my children getting older, and getting better at the 
game. 
One is not necessarily deprived relative to others. One can also compare to 
one's own situation in the past. Comparison of my present chess playing ability 
to  my  abilities  in  the past  reinforces my deprivation with respect  to  this 
dimension. 
7 CAN EVALUATIONS BE ABSOLUTE? 
Before returning to the more restricted area of preference formation, let me 
briefly discuss a related theory from experimental psychology. This so-called 
Adaptation Level theory (AL theory, for short) has been developed by Helson 
(1964).  The central notion in this theory -  adaptation level- is defined by 
Helson as follows '...  adaptation level is defined as a weighted geometric 
mean of all stimuli impinging upon the organism from without and all stimuli 
affecting behavior from within.'16 Of course, this is a rather vague description, 
which has to be operationalized within a concrete context. Therefore, I briefly 
present some examples. 
The first example deals with an  experiment carried out by Helson and 
Kozaki.  17  Four  groups  of five experimental subjects  were  shown  random 
patterns of 10, 12,  14, 16 and 18 dots respectively. Each pattern was visible 
during 3/10ths of a second. Before this, one group was shown a random pattern 
of 4 dots, the second one a pattern of 13 dots and the third group a pattern of 32 
dots. The fourth group (the control group) was not shown a dot pattern in 
advance. During the experiment, the experimental subjects had to estimate 
how many dots they were shown each time. It turned out that the first group, 
which had been shown 4 dots before the experiment, consistently gave the 
highest estimates whereas the third group, which had been shown 32 dots in 
advance, gave the lowest estimates. The remaining two groups gave estimates 
in between. Here, the adaptation level is defined as a weighted geometric 
average of the random dot pattern shown to them before the experiment. By 
this definition, the first group has the lowest adaptation level, and hence 
provides the highest estimates in the experiment. The third group has the 
highest adaptation level and therefore gives the lowest estimate of the number 
of dots shown to them. 
A somewhat related experiment is due to Ross and Thibaut (1974). Experi- 
mental subjects were shown 19 slides, each for one-fourth of a second. The 
slides showed 16 x 16 matrices containing zeros and ones. The subjects were 
told that each matrix represented the judgment of a jury of 16 laymen who had 
evaluated paintings with respect to 16 different dimensions, like color, com- 
16  Helson (1964, p. 59). 
17  Cf. Helson and Kozaki (1968).  The experiment is also described in Helson (1971). UTILITY AND ECONOMICS  11 
position, perspective, etc.  A 'one' represents a good evaluation and a 'zero,' 
represents a bad evaluation. Thus, the more ones a slide shows, the better was 
the corresponding painting evaluated. For half of the subjects, the nineteen 
slides were presented in increasing order of the number of ones. For the other 
half of the subjects, the presentation was in decreasing order of the number of 
ones. After that, both groups were shown one more slide with exactly as many 
ones as zeros. The subjects were asked to rate this last picture on a scale from 1 
(an extremely bad painting) to 20 (an outstanding painting). It turns out that 
the first group, which saw slides in order of an increasing number of ones, gave 
a significantly lower rating to this last painting than the second group. 
The common elements of RD theory and AL theory are obvious. Evalua- 
tions, opinions and perceptions are nonconstant, but are formed under the 
influence of previous experiences. These previous experiences then serve as a 
standard of comparison. In view of the large variety of phenomena that is 
covered by AL theory and RD theory, it would be quite a surprise if utility 
functions were immutable. And indeed they are not! Approximately eight 
years ago, I formulated a theory of preference formation which has major 
communalities with AL and RD theory, albeit that at the time I had never 
heard of AL theory.  18 
8 A  THEORY  OF PREFERENCE  FORMATION 
I  will briefly sketch  the  basic  features of my theory and  then pay some 
attention to empirical evidence. 
The central notion of the theory is the so-called perceived distribution.  Let 
us, for didactic reasons, only consider preferences with respect to consumer 
goods and, moreover, restrict our attention to just one good. If we let 'income' 
be  this  one  good,  then  the  perceived  distribution is  a  perceived  income 
distribution. I will try to clarify this concept by means of a series of graphs. 
The solid line in Fig. 2 represents, for some hypothetical society, the income 
distribution. That is, for an arbitrary income measured along the horizontal 
axis (e.g.  the point y) the corresponding point at the vertical axis (point A) 
indicates which proportion of the population has an income less than or equal 
to this income. 
This  income distribution may be  observable for the  Central Bureau of 
Statistics, but for individuals in society the distribution is rather irrelevant, as 
they do not observe all other individuals and their incomes. An individual 
observes only a subset of the population, and this subset is not chosen ran- 
domly. The dashed line in Fig. 2 represents the income distribution that is 
perceived by someone who knows mainly people with low incomes. For ease 
of language, I shall say that this individual has a 'poor reference group.' The 
18  See  Kapteyn  (1977).  I  got  acquainted  with AL theory through discussions with Richard 
Easterlin. Hans Werner has been so kind as to provide me with a number of recent references to 
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Figure 2 -  Actual and perceived income distribution in a hypothetical society 
proportion of people in his reference group with an income less than or equal 
to y is equal to OB. Let us, finally, consider the third curve in Fig. 2, which is 
located to the right. This is the perceived income distribution of someone with 
an affluent reference group. In this reference group only a proportion OC of 
all people have an income less than or equal to y. 
Assuming that the notion of a 'perceived distribution' is more or less clear, I 
will next complicate this notion a little bit.  First of all, the definition will be 
broadened to also incorporate an individual's own income. In the perception 
of incomes, one's own income plays a role, and probably an important one. In 
the second place, I want the definition of a perceived distribution to encom- 
pass dynamic aspects.  Fig.  3 illustrates what ! mean by that. 
// 
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Figure 3 -  The overall perceived income distribution as a convex combination of contemporaneous 
perceived distributions 
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In Fig. 3 we consider an individual who has, during his life, perceived two 
income distributions, viz.  one during last year (the curve located to the left) 
and one during this year (the curve located to the right). I call these distribu- 
tions contemporaneous distributions in the two separate years. I define the 
overall perceived  distribution  (today)  as  a  convex combination of the  two 
contemporaneous distributions. The weights in the convex combination repre- 
sent the relative importance of the two years in the formation of the overall 
perception. The magnitude of the weights is an empirical matter. It is assumed 
in Fig. 3 that the individual under consideration gives a higher weight to this 
year than to the previous year. This appears to be a reasonable assumption, as 
one will have somewhat less vivid memories of the previous year. 
Of course, most people live longer than two years, but the principle remains 
the same. In subsequent periods an individual perceives various contempor- 
aneous income distributions and today's overall perception is a convex com- 
bination of all contemporaneous distributions. This is illustrated in a slightly 
different fashion in Fig. 4. The curve located most to the left now presents the 
overall perceived  income distribution in  the previous  year,  i.e.,  a  convex 
combination of all contemporaneous income distributions perceived by the 
individual up to and including last year. The right hand curve represents this 
year's contemporaneous perceived income distribution. The solid line is to- 
day's overall perceived income distribution. It is, in turn, a convex combina- 
tion of the two other curves. Notice that the solid line is closer to the left-hand 
curve  than  to  the  right-hand  one.  This  reflects  the  presumption  that  all 
previous years combined receive a greater weight than this year's contempo- 
ranous  distribution.  Whether  or  not  this  presumption  holds  true  can  be 
verified empirically. 
To keep my story reasonably simple, ] will not consider further complica- 
tions, such as the fact that distributions of income usually refer to families 
cum.  rel 
freq 
1 
//  J"  /f  ,/ 
~~,  i,-/'~/7"  //  7.  7  //  /" 
income 
0 
overall  Last  year 
.........  contemporaneous  this  year 
overall  this  year 
Figure 4 -  The overall perceived income distribution this year as a conve× comNnation of the 
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rather than individuals. Nor will I consider an extension of the notion of a 
perceived distribution to more dimensions, although that would not create any 
new  conceptual problem.  Furthermore,  I  will  refer  to  'overall  perceived 
distributions' as 'perceived distributions' for short. 
Thus, for didactic reasons, I restrict myself to the distribution of incomes. 
My theory of preference formation now states that someone's evaluation of 
some income y  on  a  zero-one scale  is equal to  the  value  of the perceived 
distribution function corresponding to that income y. For example: if according 
to my perceived distribution function 70% of all incomes are below 60,000.00 
guilders, then I evaluate an income equal to 60,000.00 guilders by 0.7. If 40% 
of the incomes are lower than 35,000.00 guilders, then ! evaluate an income of 
35,000.00  guilders by 0.4, etc. 
Let us  now return  to  the  Detroit housewives.  Despite  an  average  real 
increase of their incomes by 42%, their average satisfaction with their stan- 
dard of living had not increased,  although within each survey satisfaction 
increased significantly with income. These outcomes would have been pre- 
dicted by my theory. For, the incomes have increased by 42% but the distribu- 
tion  has  probably not  changed very much  and presumably the  perceived 
distributions have not changed either. 
Easterlin's findings also follow from the theory, provided at least that in 
perceived income distributions incomes in foreign countries play a negligible 
role. Under these circumstances per capita national income is basically irrele- 
vant for one's satisfaction, but one's position in the income distribution does 
matter. 
Recall, finally, the experimental subjects who were shown jury reports on 
paintings. The subjects who were shown slides with an increasing number of 
ones end up having a perceived distribution which is located farther to the right 
than the subjects who were shown slides with a decreasing number of ones, 
provided that more recently shown slides have more influence on a perceived 
distribution than the earlier ones. If we then next show the subjects a slide with 
50% ones, this slide looks less favourable compared to the first distribution 
than compared to the second distribution. This explains the differences in 
evaluation. 
It is not difficult to supplement this kind of qualitative evidence with new 
examples. I prefer, however, to briefly sketch some quantitative results that 
were obtained recently (cf. Van de Stadt et al., 1985). The results are based on 
an analysis of the first two waves of the.so-called income evaluation panel of 
the Central Bureau of Statistics, which started in 1980. Evaluations of income 
are  measured for each respondent in  the panel by means of Van Praag's 
income evaluation question. The result of this measurement is known as the 
respondent's welfare function of income (WFI). An individual's WFI describes 
his evaluations of income levels on a zero-one scale. 19 It follows from my 
19  See Van Praag (1968) for its theoretical  basis. UTILITY AND ECONOMICS  15 
theory of preference formation that an individual's measured WFI has to be 
identical to his perceived income distribution. Using the information from the 
panel,  and  with  some  econometric skill,  one  can  quantify how  for each 
individual in the panel the overall perceived income distribution has changed 
from 1980 to 1981. 
Fig. 5 illustrates some of the results.  It shows for an arbitrarily selected 
individual in the panel the overall perceived income distribution in 1980, the 
overall perceived income distribution in 1981 and the contemporaneous dis- 
tribution in 1981. The figure shows that the 1981-contemporaneous distribution 
has considerably less influence on the overall perceived distribution in 1981 
than the overall perceived distribution in 1980. To be a little more precise, 
according to  our estimates the most recent contemporaneous distribution 
receives a weight of approximately 20%  and all preceding contemporaneou  s 
distributions combined receive a weight equal to 80%. 
Since, according to the theory, the overall perceived distribution and the 
WFI are identical, one can also read Fig. 5 as follows. An individual's 1981 WFI 
is  a  convex combination of his  1980 WFI  and the  1981-contemporaneous 
perceived distribution, where the most recent contemporaneous distribution 
causes an 'innovation' of the WFI with 20%. 
The contemporaneous perceived income distribution consists of two essen- 
tial elements: one's own income and the incomes of all others in the social 
reference group. Our research indicates that one's own income gets a weight 
which is approximately two times higher than all other incomes combined. It 
can be shown that as a result an increase of one's own income by 10% has the 
same beneficial effects on the satisfaction level as a decrease by 10% of the 
incomes of all others in the social reference group. 
All evidence we have considered so far indicates that the preference forma- 
tion theory provides a good explanation of differences in the evaluation of 
income among individuals. 
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Figure 5 -  The 1981-W£I as a convex combination of the 1981-contemporaneous distribution and 
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9 SOME CONSEQUENCES  FOR ECONOMICS 
Let me return to the theme I started out with. By using a directly measurable 
cardinal utility concept, Van Praag's WFI, it appears possible to quantify and 
test  a  theory of preference  formation.  Although I  have  only mentioned 
investigations with respect to incomes, earlier work has shown that similar 
analyses can be carried out with respect to somewhat narrower expenditure 
categories (cf.  Kapteyn et al.,  1980). The aforementioned research with re- 
spect to RD and AL theory makes it clear, moroever, that the preference 
formation theory is  part  of a  quite  general  mechanism that  can  also  be 
observed outside economics. 
What are the consequences of our results for economics? The answer is 
'none,' if we assume that the utility concepts we have used in the empirical 
tests of the preference formation theory are not related at all to the indirectly 
measured utility concepts that underlie models of economic behaviour. It has 
to be  admitted that the utility functions that have been measured directly 
hitherto are usually one-dimensional, or two-dimensional at most.  2° Further- 
more, there have been very few attempts to predict behavior on the basis of 
these directly measured utility functions.  2~ Thus, at the very least there is a 
difference in emphasis between our own research and research into neoclassi- 
cal models of behaviour. The main reason for this is that we want to learn more 
about utility functions before their impact on behaviour is investigated. In the 
last instance, it is a matter of belief to claim that models that deal with directly 
measured utility functions, e.g. my preference formation theory, are also valid 
for the indirectly measured utility  functions that underlie models of behaviour. 
I  find it hard  to imagine, however, that verbal evaluations and indirectly 
observed  preferences  would  be  entirely unrelated.  For  example,  when  I 
observe that someone's opinion about the income he needs to maintain a 
decent standard of living depends heavily on the incomes in his social reference 
group, then I find it quite implausible that his preferences regarding how to 
spend his income are not related to the consumption pattern in his reference 
group. 
A related example deals with the measurement of the cost of living associ- 
ated  with  different family compositions. Both the  direct  and  the indirect 
approach  aim at finding the compensating money amounts (family allow- 
ances) which would leave families that differ only with respect to their com- 
position equally well off. If the two approaches would yield different compen- 
sating amounts, it would imply that direct and indirect measurement of utility 
give different results. In that case I would not rest until an explanation for the 
discrepancy was found. Hitherto, such a discrepancy has not occurred. 
20  An example of a directly measured two-dimensional utility function can be found in Dagenais 
(1977). 
21  An exception is Kapteyn et al.  (1979). UTILITY AND ECONOMICS  17 
To repeat, it is ultimately a matter of belief, but the belief is not unfounded. 
So let us repeat the  question of what consequences our findings  have for 
economics, now assuming that directly and indirectly measured utility func- 
tions are closely related concepts. I will mention a number of them. 
In the first place, the preference formation theory makes it clear that there is 
no such thing  as a  'true'  functional form of the utility function.  Whenever 
perceived distribution functions change, utility functions change with them. 
Attempts to find the true form of utility functions, or to approximate the true 
form by flexible specifications (cf. e.g.,  Christensen, Jorgenson, Lau, 1975, or 
Jorgenson and Lau, 1979) become futile. There is no true functional form. 
A related, somewhat surprising, consequence is that the attempt to measure 
utility functions directly threatens  the central  role of the utility concept in 
economics. Although utility functions are useful measurable representations 
of preferences, the more fundamental concept is the perceived distribution 
function. 
From  the  viewpoint  of building  an  efficient research  strategy,  it  seems 
obvious to me that demand systems, consumption functions, labour supply 
functions, etc.,  are fundamentally misspecified if preference formation is not 
accounted for. Of course, misspecified models do not contribute greatly to the 
quality of econometric forecasts. 
From a policy viewpoint, it is equally important to take preference forma- 
tion into account. If, for instance, it is incorrectly assumed that utility functions 
are constant,  a  high national  income is the remedy for all problems.  If we 
account for the relatively of utility, it becomes clear that,  for example, the 
extent of poverty within a country is not primarily a function of the level of 
national income, but rather of its distribution. 
For those who have always claimed that incomes have to be redistributed in 
a more equitable way, the theory provides a warning, however. If the distribu- 
tion of incomes (or of goods, or of other sources of satisfaction) becomes more 
equal, perceived distributions become more equal as well.  Put differently, 
although income differences may decrease, the corresponding change in per- 
ceived distributions may induce a stronger, rather than a lesser, perception of 
these differences. The persistence of discussions about income inequality in 
the  Netherlands,  during  a  period  in  which  the  income  inequality has  de- 
creased, appears to confirm this. 
The relative nature of my preference formation theory does not imply that 
economic growth, i.e.,  an across-the-board rise of incomes, is irrelevant for 
someone's evaluation of his standard of living. Incomes from the past are part 
of a  perceived income distribution  and  if the current income exceeds past 
incomes, the current income ranks highly in the perceived distribution. It is not 
the level of income that counts, but its growth. 18  A. KAPTEYN 
10 CONCLUSION 
The central theme of this paper has been that if 'utility' is the central concept of 
economics, it should  be given the attention  it deserves.  Various  examples 
indicate the importance of doing this. Ignoring pr~eference formation leads to 
economic models that are misspecified. For policy purposes, the problem of 
using misspecified models is perhaps only minor compared to the fact that in 
the formulation of policy goals, preference formation is neglected as well, so 
that political goals turn out to be systematically unattainable.  By means of 
inadequate tools we try to reach unattainable goals. 
The paper is also a plea for interdisciplinary research. Had we watched the 
activities of our colleagues in the sister social sciences a little better, we might 
have realized  earlier  that  utility functions can  be measured  and that  they 
change all the time. Economics might have become more useful as a result. 
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Summary 
UTILITY AND ECONOMICS 
Although 'utility' has been the central concept in economics, economists have paid relatively little 
attention to its measurement. Generally, utility is measured indirectly via the revealed preference 
approach.  We discuss  problems with this approach and next introduce alternative 'direct' mea- 
surement methods.  The direct measurement methods are seen to spawn a so-called theory of 
preference formation, which explains differences in utility functions of different individuals. The 
similarities of this theory with related theories in sociology and psychology, and various sorts of 
empirical evidence, are reviewed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
these findings for economic theories. 